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THE STOCKLEY VERDICT: AN EXPLAINER 
Chad Flanders* 
The purpose o f  this document is to help explain some o f  the existing 
Missouri law that Judge Wilson used in his opinion. It does not take a side 
on the opinion itself. At the end o f  the day, the decision Judge Wilson made 
was based on his call on various disputed factual questions. The law was 
not, for  the most part, at issue. I attempt only to describe the legal 
framework within with Judge Wilson decided the case; not to support or to 
criticize his verdict. Each person will ultimately have to make his or her 
own judgment about whether the decision was correct. 
Page numbers refer to the opinion, available here. 
p. 18) The standard of proof in a trial is "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." This is the same in a bench trial as in a jury trial. The state has the 
burden of proof as to each element of the crime. 
p. 18) There are three elements to first degree murder: the person must
have 1) knowingly, 2) caused the death of another person, and 3) after 
deliberation upon the matter. 1 "Knowing," as it relates to a result means 
that you are aware of the "practical certainty" that your action will cause 
that result. There is no dispute, here, that Stockley caused the death of 
Anthony Lamar Smith, and did it aware that his actions were practically 
certain to cause the result. One of the key questions in the case is whether 
he did so with "deliberation." (The other key question was whether he 
acted in self-defense). 
p. 18) "Deliberation" is defined by statute as "cool reflection for any
• Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This document is my best 
effort to explain the legal issues in the Stockley verdict. It was written quickly, so please 
make allowances. Corrections will be made as necessary and the article will be updated 
when possible. Feel free to send comments to chad.flanders(a  lu.<!du Thanks to the staff 
of the law journal for making the timely posting of this article possible. 
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1 Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMO) 565.020. 
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length of time, no matter how brief."2 Missouri court cases have found 
deliberation to happen in a matter of seconds, or even the time it takes to 
snap a finger, so it may be better interpreted to mean "they acted 
deliberately" rather than that "they thought about it for a while."3
p. 18) Mental states, like deliberation, are usually inferred from the 
circumstances. We can't read people's minds. 4 But we can look at what 
they do and say to figure out what they thought. 5 
p. 19) The defendant has the burden of injecting self-defense into the 
proceedings,6 but the defendant has no burden to prove that he did act in 
self-defense. This means there has to be some evidence of each element of 
self-defense present in the evidence before the court (the elements of self-
defense are explained in more detail below), but the defense doesn't have 
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did act in self-
defense (who has this burden is explained in the next paragraph). As the 
2 RSMO 565.002. 
3 As the State notes, it appears that, in addition to claiming insufficient evidence of  
deliberation, Terry is raising a claim that the State improperly represented to the jury the 
time necessary to prove deliberation. During closing arguments, the prosecutor snopped his 
fingers to demonstrate the time necessary for deliberation. Terry argues thot such a 
representation is of an "instantaneous'" action. We disagree. 'The shortness of time for 
deliberating and premeditoting killing is immoterial for purposes of proving murder in the 
first degree." State v. Hudson, 154 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Mo.App.S.D.2005). Deliberotion only 
requires o "brief moment of'cool reflection:" Cole, 71 S.W.3d at 169. In this case, Terry 
had not only a brief moment but a matter of minutes to decide to abandon the attack. He 
had multiple opportunities to abandon the robbery turned murder. He injured Schwartz, 
knocking him to the ground and incopocitating him, before he chose to shoot him directly 
in the head. 
Stole v. Terry, 501 S.W.3d 456,460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
4 "'Direct proof thot a person acted 'knowingly' is o ften unavoilable ,md is usually 
infe1Ted from evidence of the circumstances surrounding the incident.'' State v. Browning. 
357 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Mo.App. S.D.2012) (quoting State 1°. Fackrell, 277 S.W.3d 859. 
863 64 (Mo.App. S.D.2009)). 
State v. Hibler, 422 S.W.3d 407,409 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) 
5 However, because it [deliberation] is a state of mind, direct proof is seldom available 
and the element must be infened from the circumstances. 
State v. Bridges, 810 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) 
6 This is part of the self-defense statute. RSMO. 563.03 l.5. 
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court notes, either side can show this evidence, but it is usually the defense 
that does this, as it is in their interest in do so. Once the evidence is out 
there, then--in a jury case--there will be a basis for the judge to instruct the 
jury on the instruction. If it is a bench trial ( only a judge), it will be up to 
the judge to consider the defense. 
p. 19) If there is some evidence supporting self-defense--enough so that
it goes to the trier of fact (the judge or the jury) to decide on it, then the 
state gets a new burden. This is something in the law that is very helpful to 
Stockley: it is as if the state has a new burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Stockley did not act in self-defense. 7 In a way, the introduction 
of self-defense, adds a new element to the crime. Now, the state has to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stockley 1) knowingly, 2) caused the 
death of another, 3) after deliberation and 4) he did not act in self-defense. 
p. 19) Law enforcement officer's use of force. At the time, Missouri's
self-defense statute did not include a "stand your ground" provision. That 
meant that if someone threatened force on you, and you could avoid using 
force by running way, you had a duty to do so. This does not apply (and 
never did apply) to law enforcement officers, per Missouri statute. They do 
not have to run away in the face of a threat of force. 8 This exception is 
explicitly noted in the self-defense statute.9 
p. 19) The verdict also mentions that law enforcement officers can use
force to effect the arrest of a person who is fleeing, who is trying to escape 
by means of a deadly weapon, and the officer reasonably believes force is 
necessary to make the arrest. 10 This may seem to apply in this case, but it 
doesn't really. As the defense's written submission makes clear, Stockley 
was arguing self-defense, not that he was using force in order to arrest 
Smith. (This provision may, apply, however, to the shots Stockley fired at 
7 RSMO 556.035 ("If the issue is submitted to the trier of fact any reasonable doubt on 
the issue requires a finding for the defendant on that issue.") 
8 "A law enforcement officer nee<l not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the a rrest, 
or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person he or she reasonably 
believes to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the 
arrestee." RSMO. 563.046. 
9 RSMO. 563.031.l(c) (law enforcement officer can permissibly be the "initial 
aggressor"). 
10 Although the law enforcement officer use of force statute has changed recently, this 
was always part ofit. See RSMO. 563.046.3. 
4 THE STOCKLEY VERDICT: AN EXPLAINER [15-Sept-09 
the car, or when the police vehicle rammed the vehicle Smith was driving.) 
pp. 19-20) The statement by Stockley as evidence of deliberation. 
Evidence of someone "planning" to kill someone is relevant to inferring 
d l.b . " e 1 erat10n. 
p. 20) A "fifth shot." Multi le gunshots, 12 shots at close range, 13 and 
shots to vital parts of the body, 4 can be used to show deliberation. An 
execution style shot or a "kill shot" can be part of evidence used to show 
deliberation. 15 
pp. 20-21 ). The fact that Smith and Stockley did not know one another-
11 Evidence of conduct that is relevant to the issue of deliberation in a first degree 
murder case falls into a least four broad categories. First, there may be direct evidence that 
the defendant did or said certain things in advance of the act to facilitate the crime. This is 
'"planning evidence.'" 
State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 589 (Mo. 1997) 
12 Evidence of a prolonged struggle, multiple wounds, or repeated blows may also 
support an inference of deliberation. 
State v. Elvin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 159 (Mo. 1998). 
13 Even further, assuming the jury believed that Terry shot Schwartz from the distance 
of a few inches-a fact upon which there was conflicting evidence-there is yet another 
basis for finding deliberation. See Tisius. 92 S.W.3d at 764 (repeated shooting at close-
range supported finding of deliberation); State 1·. Bra11cli, 757 S.W.2d 595, 598 
(Mo.App.E.D.1988) (shooting at close range was some evidence of deliberation). 
State v. Teny. 501 S.W.3d 456,460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). reh'g and/or transfer denied 
(Aug. 30, 2016), transfer denied (Nov. 1, 2016) 
14 Rejecting a contention that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the 
element of deliberation, this Court held that the number. severity and location of the 
wounds provided such a basis and that the inference of deliberation was made more 
apparent by the fact that the assailant had procured and concealed a knife. 
State v. Dickson, 691 S.W.2d 334,339 (Mo. C t  App. 1985) 
15 The evidence, however, also suppo1ts the conclusion that the fatal wounds were 
inflicted at the Blue Valley Park in an execution style killing which would clearly establish 
deliberation. The manner of Ms. Walker's death, therefore, supported an inference of 
deliberation. but did not conclusively establish deliberation. 
State v. Maynard, 954 S.W.2d 624. 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
... 
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-had no "prior history"--is highlighted by the Judge as "sig n ificant." "Bad
blood" between two parties can be evidence to show deliberation. 16 
However, it seems possible that a basis for "bad blood" could be found in a) 
Smith's ramming the police vehicle, and b) leading the officers on a chase.
Moreover, deliberation can be found even if there is no prior hostile
relationship. 17 
p. 21n.10) The court suggests that in situations that are "dangerous,"
"stressful" and "frenetic" show lack of "cool" deliberation. However, cases 
involving similar dangerous, stressful, and frenetic circumstances have not 
barred a finding of deliberation--especially given that deliberation can arise 
in a matter of seconds. 18 As the Missouri Supreme Court put it in a 2013 
opinion, "Deliberation is not a question of t ime-an  instant is sufficient-
and the reference to 'cool reflection' does not require that the defendant be 
detached or disinterested. Instead, the element of deliberation serves to 
ensure that the jury believes the defendant acted deliberately, consciously 
and not reflexively." 19 
p. 24) Self-defense. As noted above, the statute has undergone some
changes. But the core has remained the same, and the basics are this: if you 
fear imminent use of deadly force against you, and reasonably believe that 
only deadly force is sufficient to remove the threat to your life/physical 
safety, you are justified in using deadly force to remove the threat. Thus the 
elements of self-defense when deadly force is used are roughly: 1) the 
defendant didn't start it, 2) there was a real necessity for the defendant to 
use deadly force in order to save himself/herself from danger, 3) the 
16 Second, there may be evidence of a pre-existing relationship between the victim and 
the de fe ndant prior to the murder that provides a motiw for the killing. This is "bad-blood 
evidence.'" 
State v. Miller. 220 S.W.3tl 862, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) 
17 As one treatise explains: 
Even when there is no prior relationship between victim an<l <lefen<lant an<l the time 
for deliberation is brief, the particular facts of a case can lead lo a finding that 
premeditation has been sufficiently proved. 
§ 95:18.Premeditation, 3 Crim. Prac. Manual§ 95:18
18 See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 810 S.W.2tl 682. 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (deliberation
found lo have occuned during a struggle for a purse during a robbery). 
19 State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Mo. 2013). 
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defendant's belief in the necessity was reasonable, and 4) the defendant did 
all within his power to avoid the danger and the need to take a life. 20 As 
explained above, while a police officer does have to use less than deadly 
force if that would be enough to prevent the danger, the officer does not 
have to retreat--and in fact, can pursue a person he or she believes is 
dangerous (so in some sense, they may be the "initial aggressor"). 
p. 24) Judge Wilson sees the key factual question as whether Smith had
a gun; someone pointing a deadly weapon at you is a rather common basis 
for asserting self-defense, and one can win on self-defense even if the 
weapon is not found ( or did not exist), provided that the belief that the 
weapon was there was reasonable. 2 1 
p. 26) The court's observation based on "thirty years on the bench"
about urban heroin dealers and guns. Judges--in jury trials--usually can 
only find "facts" if they are uncontroversial and widely known (something 
known as taking "judicial notice" of facts). 22 But things are different in a 
bench trial. Here, the judge acts as the jury. Jurors are not confined to the 
facts at the trial, but can use facts from their experience as a basis for a 
judgment. So there is less of a constraint on the kinds of facts that can be 
20 These are from a case called Chambers: 
Deadly force may be used in self-defense only when there is (1) an absence of 
aggression or provocation on the part of the defender, (2) a real or apparently real necessity 
for the defender to kill in order to save himself from an immediate danger of serious bodily 
injury or death, (3) a reasonable cause for the defender's belief in such necessity, and (4) an 
attempt by the defender to do all within his power consistent with his personal safety to 
avoid the danger and the need to take a life. 
State v. Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1984) 
21 The appearances doctrine operates to justify a person to act in self-defense although 
it later proves the appearances were false. 
State v. Minnis, 486 S.W.2d 280,283 (Mo. 1972) 
22 The application of the doctrine of judicial notice, either as a rule of evidence or as an 
instrument of judicial reasoning, is subject to well recognized limits. The basic operative 
condition of judicial notice is the notoriety of the fact to be noticed. It must be pait of the 
common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelligence; only then 
does it become proper to assume the existence of that fact without proof. It follows, 
therefore, that judicial notice must be exercised cautiously, and if  there is doubt as to the 
notoriety of such fact. judicial recognition of it must be declined. 
English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S. W .2d 33, 40-41 (Mo. 1968) 
.. 
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considered: jurors can use their own common sense and their experience to 
bring to bear on a case. Still, that experience must be "common."23 
A Supreme Court case from earlier this year may be worth mentioning 
in light of some recent commentary on the verdict.24 In Pena-Rodriguez v. 
California, the Court held that racially charged statements made by a juror 
could be the basis for vacating a death sentence.25 This however is an 
acquittal, not a conviction, so there does not appear to be any basis for the 
state to challenge the verdict on the grounds that the Judge demonstrated 
bias.26
The Judge also, presumably, imputed this (to him) commonsense 
observation to Stockley. In footnote 9 (p. 21 ), Judge Wilson notes he 
rejected the defense's request to introduce evidence of Smith's prior 
criminal record, because Stockley did not know it. But perhaps Stockley 
would have a similar record of experience as the Judge, and so be aware of 
the probability of a gun. It is also possible that the Judge's observation is 
used merely to enhance, in the Judge's eyes, the credibility of Stockley as to 
whether the gun was found or planted. In fact, this seems the safest 
assumption. 
23 In the words of one old Missouri case: 
Jurors may sometimes draw on knowledge that comes from the common experience of 
mankind to ossist them in reaching a conclusion, but that is knowledge that men in general 
have, not a few in particular. If it is knowledge that comes by the cxpe1icnce of a class in o 
particular business it must be proven by evidence. 
Bownrnn v. Am. Car & Foundrv Co., 226 Mo. 53, 125 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1910) 
24 See, e.g., the recently published op-ed, Judge Wilson is guilty - as hell - o f  explicit 
bias, The St. Louis American (Sept. 15, 2017). 
25 [T]he Court now holds that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he 
or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth 
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rnle give way in order to pe1mit the trial 
comt to consider the evidence of the juror's statement an<l any resulting denial of  the jury 
Ilia! guarantee. 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017) 
26 This goes to the fundamental asymmetry in a criminal trial, as embodied in the rule 
against putting a criminal defendant in "double jeopardy." A defendant who loses can 
appeal, and usually does. When the state loses--and the defendant is acquitted--it is only in 
very rare circumstances that the state can challenge the verdict and ask for a do-over. 
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p. 29) In a case where first degree murder is charged, other homicide
charges are "lesser included offenses." In theory, the judge could have 
found Stockley guilty of a lesser, homicide charge. The state wanted him to 
do this, if he found Stockley innocent of first degree murder. The defense 
did not--they wanted first degree murder or nothing. This strategically may 
make some sense, especially if they thought they were especially strong on 
self-defense. 
pp. 29-30) In a case called State v. Beeler, the Missouri Supreme Court 
held that even in a case where self-defense was successful against first 
degree murder, it could be that a lesser homicide charge was supported. 27 If 
you shot in justified self-defense, but used more force than was necessary, 
you might still be guilty of recklessly causing the death of another, even if 
you did not intentionally kill another.28 Nonetheless, because Judge Wilson 
found that Stockley's use of force was justified, he felt that Stockley was 
not guilty of any homicide crime, and declined to consider the possible 
lesser charges in any detail. 
27 As a later case explained: 
We acknowledge that, under Beeler, the fact that Pulley intentionally shot Coleburg. 
does not, as a matter of law, foredose the possibility that he could be acquitted of second-
degree murder. and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 
State v. Pullev, 356 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) 
28 [R]eckless conduct is not inconsistent with the intentional act of defending one's 
self, if in doing so one uses unreasonable force. 
State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294. 299 (Mo. 2000) 
